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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
J. SEAL,
Plaintjj and Appellant,
Case No.
10171

- vs.-

TAYCO, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action· on··account ·by Appellant .who
is ·an assignee for merchandise sold.· in· the amount
of $3,584.42. Respondent .admitted the account and
claimed an offset thereto in the amount of $2,590.00.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ,
.

.

'

.

.

.'

The case was tried to a jury on ;May 18;·1964
in the District Court of Salt Lake County. The ju;ry
returned a verdict for Appellant on _1ter assigned
accpunt and found for ~espondent 011 its offset.
1
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The Court entered judgment for Appellant for the
difference between the account and offset in the
amount of $994.42 plus interest of $134.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant demands that the judgment be modified so as to elin1inate therefrom the offset claim
of Respondent's as found by the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Appellant is a bonded collection
agency. The account sued on was owned by American Maganese Steel Division of the American Brake
Shoe Company. Since Appellant, J. Seal, is only a
nominal party in this<. action, Respondent will hereinafter refer to Appellant as "AMSCO" which is
the trade name of the owner of the account.
Respondent, Tayco, Inc., is a Utah corporation,
the stock of which at the time of the institution of
this law suit \vas almost completely owned by one
J. Verne Taylor. Prior to incorporation, the business had been conducted by Mr. Taylor as a sole
proprietor (R. 37). The business had been operated as a corporation and as a sole proprietorship
for approximately 15 years at the time this law suit
was instituted (R. 37 and 38).
Respondent's connection with "AMSCO" went
back a number of years. Respondent was a distribu2
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tor for "AMSCO" and originally sold their products
in Utah and eastern Nevada. The terri tory later
included parts of Idaho. "AMSCO" n1anufactures
electrodes, steel bar stock, and shape steels and these
were the products distributed and sold in this territory by Respondent ( R. 38) .
Respondent was an "AMSCO" distributor in
the year "1957" and in that year the setoff which
is the subject matter of this law suit occurred.* In
January 19 57 this oompany obtained an order from
the Palisade Dam contractors for the purchase of
certain track shoes. Track shoes are the n1etal pads
on which the crawler type vehicles travel over the
ground ( R. 41). A formal written purchase order
was issued by Palisades contractor, dated january
30, 1957 (Ex. 1). Prior to the date _ of this order,
Respondent's salesman had been in contact with the
Palisade Dam contractors and Respondents had also
been in contact with "AMSCO" regarding these
parts (R. 57).
1

On January 25, 1957 "AMSCO" issued a written com1nitment regarding t~ese track shoes. (Ex. 2).
On January 31, 1957, Respondent issued its
purchase order, No. 7144 to "AMSCO'' for the purchase of the track shoes ordered by Palisades contractors on January 30, 1957 (Ex. 3).
*It w~s agreed bet~een the p~~es that "A:M_SOO"; ·is a foreign corporation that has neve~ qua.I!fied ~to do bu~111~s in this state and
hence, the Statute of Limitations Is not an ISsue in this case.
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Thereafter on February 22, 1957 Respondent
received a post card from "AMSCO" indicating that
they had scheduled shipment one-half in April 1957
and one-half in May 1957 (Ex. 8).
It is to be noted at this point that in both the
"AMSCO" (Ex. 2) and Respondent's purchase order (Ex. 3) tin1e of delivery was clearly specified
as of April 15, 19'57. On March 2, 1'957 Respondent
wrote to "AMSCO" concerning the post card (Ex. 8)
and stated as follows:
''It is necessary to determine two i ten1s
in this letter. First, the card received fron1
Mr. Spangenberg on February 22 about the
above order. This order was accepted by us
for delivery not later than the 2nd week in
April 1957 based on authority of Mr. Dantiko and this delivery was by our customer
specfied as being very necessary. Hence, your
card ·which specified one-half of the order
would be shipped in April and one-half in
May absoluately dismayed us.
"Will you please advance your schedule
to meet the promised quotation given by Mr.
Dantiko by airn1al 1-23-57, Quotation No.
125-I-187, this was specified as sure of delivery by April 15, 1957, Order placed on
this basis."
On April 10, 1957 Palisades contractors forwarded a telegran1 to Respondent which stated as
follows:
"Cancel our Order 56-2150 for three sets,
26-inch shoes for HD tractors, because of fail4
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ure to meet the requirements.
S/ D. W. Kelley, Palisades Contractors"
(Ex. 4)
Thereafter on May 4, 1957 Respondent again
wrote to "AMSCO" and stated in part as follows:
''This letter is to acquaint you with the
situation at Palisades. We contacted the boys
there and they say they are not in a position
to take the 26-inch shoes which they ordered
and then cancelled, their No. 56-2150, our
Order 7144 (Ex. 9)."
The above Exhibits comprise the documentary
evidence relating to the purchase of the track shoes.
Mr. J. Verne Taylor also testified concerning the
transaction. On direct examination he_ testified that
'"AMSCO" never billed Respondent for the track
shoes and in fact that only 100 of the.m were ever
n1ade and that these· were not ma,de or Q,vailable
until the latter part of May 1957 (R.46-47). Additionally Mr. Taylor testified that after he had
received the post card which pu.rported to change
the date of delivery, he talked to Mr~· Ed Welsh
who was head of·· the. foundry and was. advised by
hin1 that he would do his best to n1eet the April 15,
1957 deadline (R. 62-63).
.

.

''AMSCO'' contends that this documentary evidence and the testimony of Mr.· Taylor does not
show a breach of contract entitling Respondent to
da1nages. Under the points of argu1nent that follow,
5
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Respondent will show that this evidence shows a
contract, a breach thereof by "AMSCO" for which
damages by way of setoff were properly awarded
by the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
"AMSCO" WAS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH
OF CONTRACT.

Appellant argues that Paragraph 4 (c) of Exhibit 2 ( "AMSCO" quotation) eff1ectively insulates it
from Respondent's claim for damages for breach of
contract.
1

'Paragraph 4 (c) of the "AMSCO" quote (Exhibit 2) reads :
" (c) Seller shall not be liable for any delays
or defaults hereunder by reason of fire,
floods, acts of God, labor troubles, inability
to secure raw materials, acts of government,
or other causes beyond reasonable control. In
the event of any such delay, the date of delivery shall be extended for a period equal to
the time lost by reason of the delay. In no
event shall seller be liable for special or consequential damages."
Appellant concedes that none of the causes for
delay mentioned in Paragraph 4 (c) are applicable
to this case and further concedes that it would be
more desirable had the last sentence of the above
quotation be placed in a separate paragraph.
6
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The question before the lower court as before
this court is the proper construction of that paragraph. The lower court correctly ruled that the
paragraph means that the seller shall not be liable
for delays caused by extraordinary reasons and that
in no event would seller be liable ·for special or consequential damage by reason of delay from extraordinary causes. "AMSCO" wrote this contractual
provision. Under settled law, the provision must be
construed n1ost strongly against the maker. Maw
,.s. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121.
Appellant contends that Paragraph 4 (c)
means that it is not liable for special or consequential damage for any· reason. Questions immediately
arise. Is "AMSCO" liable for any delay? Is it liable
for breach of warranty? Is It liable for misdelivery?
If "AMSCO" intended to immunize itself from all
liability and pllace its customers completely at its
mercy, surely it would have inserted a separate paragraph in Exhibit 2 and insulated itself with appropriate language.
The interpretation adopted by the lower court
is correct. The lower court simply held that the
meaning of the last sentence of Paragraph 4 (c)
n1ust bear some relationship to the terms, p_receding it. It cannot be taken out of context and given
universal application. A logi_cal · interpretation of
the paragraph is that "AMSCO" is not liable g~ner7
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ally for extraordinary causes and in no event is liable
for special or consequential damages occasioned by
the extraordinary causes n1entioned in the paragraph.
''AMSCO" cites the case of Eastern Brass and
Copper Company, Inc. vs. General Electric Supply
Corporation, 101 F. Supp. 410 in support of its position. The case is easily distinguishable. The contract in the Eastern Brass case (supra) did have a
paragraph providing immunity from extraordinary
causes. In a separate paragraph the contract provided:

''We shall not under any circumstances
be liable for special or consequential damages
on account of delay in furnishing merchandise contracted for or on account of the use
or re-sale of such merchandise."
In that case the contract specifically provided
the area in which the seller was insulated from liability. There is no such preciseness of language in
this case. The provision contended for by "AMSCO"
is contained in a paragraph which n1entions delay
caused by extraordinary events. Clearly it is restricted to those events.
The last contention of Appellant under its Point
I. is that the damages in this case a warded to Respondent were special and not general and, therefore, eliminated by the obscure language of Paragraph 4 (c).
8
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Respondent lost its profit on the re-sale of this
merchandise by reason of Appellant's breach of contract. What we are here concerned with is whether
loss of profits is special or general damage. Appellant cites no case or other authority for its
statement that the damages in this case are special
damage.
The distinction between general and special
damage is not always an easy one to n1ake. It depends in great part upon the facts of each individual case. The general rule is stated in 25 CJS
(damages) Section 138 :
"Whether or not recovery may be had
for, or proof made, of loss of profits under
a general .allegation of damages depends, of
course, on whether or not such damages are
on the facts involved to be considered general
or special. Under some authorities, where the
wrong complained of consists of or occasions
the breach of contract the loss of profits arising from the breach may be recovered under
a general allegation of damage, particularly
where such loss is the natural and necessary
result of the breach of contract. Under others,
however, .a loss of profits resuting from
breach of contract are considered special rather than general damages and must be
pleaded to permit recovery thereof."
By definition, gener~l damages are those that
naturally and necessarily flow from- the wrongful
act, while special dan1ages are such as naturally but
9
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not necessarily flow therefron1. In the Utah case of
Anderson et al vs. Jensen et al, 71 Utah 295, 265
P. 745, it is stated:
''General damages, this court has held
'are the natural and proximate consequences
of, and are traceable to the act complained of
and those damages which are probable, traceable to, and necessarily result from the injury
. . . and may be shown under the general allegation of the complaint. Only those damages
which are- not probable and the necessary result of the injury are termed "special" and
required to be stated specially in the complaint.' "
The question in this case is whether the loss
of profits are damages such as naturally and necessarily flow from the breach (general damage) as
opposed to those damages which naturally but do
not necessarily flow therefrom (special damage).
The distinction in this case is readily apparent from
the documentary evidence on file. On Exhibit 3,
the purchase order of Respondent, it is clearly stated
that this order is for re-sale to Palisades Contractors
and it is also. clearly stated that the customer specified delivery to be within two weeks of April1, 1957.
It logicallly follows that '~AMSCO" knew that the
order was one for :fte-sale and that the customer had
specified ~a particular delivery date. Quite- clearly
''A1WS'CO'' knew that the probable and natural result
of its breach by failing to deliver timely would be the
loss o'f profit on the sale. This is general damage.
10
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For a distinction, we again refer to Exhibit 3,
the Respondent's purchase order. It also states:
"This is only the beginning for this company. They have 40 tractors, so please process this order at once and try and beat their
delivery requirements."
\Vere the damage in this case a claim for loss of
profits on this future business, then there might
be some merit to the assertion that that claim was
one for special or consequential damage.
The principle is aptly stated in i15 Am. J ur.
(damages) Section 152:
"According to some authorities, the line
of distinction between profits which are re~
mote, consequential, or not within the contenlplation of the parties and those which are
proximate and absolute and certain and within the contemplation of the parties seems to
rest in the question whether they are to arrive
directly out of the contract in question or its
subject matter and to constitute the immediate fruits of the contract or whether they are
to result from collateral engagements or enterprises."
In this case the damages claimed are the direct
and proximate result of its breach. · They would .be
consequential only if· the collateral enterprise of obtaining the future business of the customer were
involved.
11
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In summary, it is the position of Respondent
that the contractual language of Exhibit 2 does not
insulate "AMSCO" from claims for either special or
general damage except as those which n1igh t arise
from extraordinary events. This is the correct interpretation of their agreement and the one adopted
by the trial court. Even assuming, arguendo, that
"AMSC·O" is not liable for specilal damage, still their
position is untenable because the offset allowed by
the jury in this ·case is general d a m a g e and
'''AMSCO" concedes that it is liable for general damage.

iri

POINT II.
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROVIDED FOR DELIVERY
BY APRIL 15, 1957 AND WAS BREACHED BY "AMSCO"
WHEN IT DID NOT DELIVER TIMELY.

Appellant argues under its Point II. that the
contract between the parties provided for delivery
of one-half the order in April, 1957 and one-half in
May, 1957 and that, therefore, there was no breach
of contract by "AMSCO" at the time Respondent's
customer cancelled its order.
The documentary evidence in this case shows
that on January 25, 1957 "AMSCO" issued its quotation on the good~.to be sold. ·This quotation specifi·~ally provided. shipment by April15, 1957.
On January 31, 1957 Respondent forwarded:its
purchase order 'for material set forth in the·· quote
for shipment April 1, 1957 (Ex. 3). Respondent
12
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also stated in that order that its customer specified
shipment to be within two weeks of April 1, 1957.
On F,ebruary 6, '1957 from the '·'A'MSCO" general
office at Chicago Heights, Illinois, a letter (Ex. 7)
was forwarded to Respondent accepting the order.
A completed contract existed at that time.
This con tract was breached by "AM'SC'O" on
February 22, 1957 when it chose to change the date
of shipment from Aprill, 19'57 or at the latest April
15, 1957 (the shipping date specified in its quotation) to ship1nent of one-half the order in April and
one-half in May (Ex. 8).
Thereafter Respondent wrote to ''AMSCO" (Ex~
5) and stated that the attempted change of delivery
date was not acceptable. Respondent requested an
advance of delivery date to meet "kMSCO's" promised quotation. Interestingly, "'A'MSCO" never replied. Then it did not ,even meet or attempt to meet
any delivery date, either contractual or otherwise,
and only 100 of the track shoes were ever made and
these were not available until the latter part of May,
1957 (R. 46).

Appellant seems to say that whether a contract
existed and was breached in this case was a question
of law for the trial court and not a matter of fact
to be determined by the jury. The lower court submitted these questions to the jury under Instruction
13
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No. 2. Appellant does not clai1n error in this Instruction, but rather contends that as a matter of
law there was no breach of contract.
"A:M'SCO". refers to its acceptance of the order
stating that it was conditional as to date of delivery.
What the "general office" had to say concerning
this is as follbWs: -·
"Within the course of the next few days,
you will receive formal acknowledgement from
each of the foundries mentioned above, and
at the same time, will receive information concerning shipment of the material."
Does "information concerning shipment" mean
that '''A:MSCO" has the right to :alter the date specified in its quotation which provided shipment on
April15? Does it in fact have anything to do with
date of shipment at all? It might very well mean information concerning method and route of shipment.
These are-questions of fact upon which reasonable men might disagree and hence, they are jury
questions.

:~:

.:a

In the lower court, "A'MSCO" offered no testimony concerning the formation or breach of this
contract or any ,testimony concerning. the meaning
of any term contained in the docun1entary evidence.
Indeed in .its Brief, it ~ites no authority for its conclusion that these-are questions of law for the trial
court.·
14
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The law does not support Appellant's contention. In 53 An1. Jur. (trial) Section 255 it is stated:
"\Vhere one party to an action affirms
and the other denies the existence of a contract, and the evidence introduced is conflicting, but there is evidence from which a contract may be inferred, the jury should determine the fact of the existence or non-existence of the contract . . . but the question
whether informal writings such as letters,
telegran1s, and other documentary evidence
show that a contract was entered into must
often be left to the jury . . ."
Again in the san1e voume of American Jurisprudence at Section 27 4, P. 232 it is stated:
"An issue as to whether a contract or
warranty has been breached is ordinarily, in
cases tried before a jury, a question for the
jury to determine from the facts and circumstances in proof, assuming that these facts are
not undisputed or that different inferences
may be drawn therefrom."
See also the dissenting opinon in Hawaiian
Equipment Company vs. Eimco Corporation, 115
Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794.
POINT III.
THE CONTRACT WAS BREACHED BY "AMSCO" AND
XOT CANCELLED BY MUTUAL CONSENT.

Under Point III. of Appellant's brief, it argues
( 1) the contract was cancelled by mutual consent
and ( 2) if not so cancelled, Respondent is estopped
to assert the claim.
15
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As to the claim of recission by mutual consent,
Appellant cites no factual evidence in the Record
to support its contention with the exception of Respondent's letter of May 4, 1957 which advises
''A'MSCO that 'Respondent's customer had cancelled
and, therefore, Respondent was cancelling the order.
At this time there had been no delivery and at least
19 days had expired from the pron1ised date of delivery.
Respondent had a legal right to cancel the contract when "AMSCO" failed to deliver. 12 Am. Jur.
(con tracts) Section 4'38.
"AMSCO" had no right to cancel the agreement
after it defaulted in performance except by a further
agreement founded upon adequate consideration.
Evidence of such agreement and · consider.ation is
completely lacking in· this ·case.
The finding of the jury that "AMSCO" breached the·agreement'predudes the assertion that it was
mutually rescinded. Further, . this issue was submitted to the jury under the Court's instruction No.
5 and resolved against .appellant.
"AM'S'CO" th,en; ·claims u_nder its Point III. that
if the contract was not rescinded, Respondent is
nonetheless estopped to assert th~ claim by reason of
delay. Without citing evidence or legal· au~hority
''AMBOO" simply states that its credulity is stretch16
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t•d beyond the breaking point to ilnagine that even
Mr. Taylor could believe that Respondent had a justi-

fiable claim.
''AMSCO" failed to point out to this Court that
it has never qualified to do business in this state
and elected to assign this claim for suit rather than
appear in its own na1ne and subject itself to the full
jurisdiction of the Courts of this state. ~other claims
of Respondent for amounts far exceeding the
"AMSCO" claim were the subject of this law suit
below and were excluded by the Court as a matter
of law. The timidity of "AMSCO" to subject itself to
the jurisdiction of the Courts of this state can be
ascribed in part to the fact that it knew at all times
that these claims by Respondent were pending
against it. Also, since Respondent could not assert
its claim in this state until ''A'MSCO" sued, there
was no 'delay.
A complete answer to Appellant's estoppel argument is that it was never an issue in the trial
below. "AMSCO" offered no evidence in this regard
and requested no instructions.
Even further, delay cannot be the basis for estoppel unless the other party has materially changed
its position to its prejudice, 19 Am. J ur. ·(estoppel)
Section 59. There is no evidence of change of position in this case.
17
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POINT IV.
MITIGATION OF DAMAGE WAS NOT AN ISSUE IN
THE .TRIAL COURT.

Under Point IV. of its brief, ''AMSCO" argues
that Respondent was under a duty to 1nitigate its
damage.
Here again we are cited no evidence in support
of Appellant's proposition that Respondent could
have obtained a reasonable substitute for the goods
in the market and thereby reduce or eliminate its
damage.
Here again the issue was ·never raised in the
trial court and no instructions were requested so
that the issue could be put to the jury.
If a seller who breaches a contract clain1s that
the buyer could have n1itigated the damage, it is up
to the seller to prove it. This rule is clearly stated
in 46 Am. Jur. (sales) Section 707. We quote:
"The burden of proving that the damages alleged to have been sustained by the
Buyer have been prevented or mitigated by
his actions rests on the seller as the party
charged with responsibility for breach of the
contract.''
This burden was never undertaken in the trial
court by Appellant.
POINT V.
TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONTRACT.

The argument of Appellant thattime was not
of the essence of this con tract can be answered very
18
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simply by referring to Ex. 3 which is the purchase
order of Respondent. It says:

"THEY SPECIFY:
DELIVERY DATE TO BE WITHIN 2
WEEKS OF APRIL 1, 1957.
SHIP AS COMPLETED FOR IF THESE
COULD BE RECEIVED BY THE 1ST. OF
APRIL THEY WOULD BE MOST HAPPY
AND THEIR START FOR SPRING WORK
WOULD BE ADVANCED THAT MUCH.''
It is difficult to conceive of how a lay person
could better state that time was of the essence of
this sale.
And here again, this issue was never raised in
the trial court.
POINT VI.
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY TO RESPONDENT WERE PROPER.

Without attempting to n1athematically analyze
in every respect and detail the damages a warded
by the jury in this case, suffice it to say that the
amount of their award of $2,590.00 was within the
figure of $2,799.84 set forth in Appellant's Brief.
CONCLUSION
Respondent believes that the only proper question before this court is the construction of the docu19

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mentary evidence submitted to the jury in this case.
These documents clearly show an agreen1ent between these parties for the sale and delivery of
certain track shoes. This issue was submitted to the
jury and the jury found a contract and also found
that it had been breached by "AMSOO."
Many issues raised on this appeal were never
raised by Appellant in the trial court. Much of the
argument of Appellant relates to issues that were
properly submitted to the jury and determined
against Appellant.
There is no error in the r-ecord and the verdict
of the jury is correct in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
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